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I. INTRODUCTION
Detroit was once a flourishing American city.  With the help of
Henry Ford and his revolutionary production techniques, Detroit
quickly established itself as the epicenter of the American automobile
industry.1  President Roosevelt later used this industrial might to cre-
ate what was called an “Arsenal of Democracy” during World War II.2
In the 1960s, a new Detroit “factory” emerged; this one geared more
towards producing hit music and a sound that defined a culture.3
This blend of blue-collar work ethic and creative genius embodied the
American Dream.
Fifty years later, the story is considerably different.  Now, Detroit
is a “ghost town.”4  The city’s once massive population has deterio-
rated at an alarming rate, with parts of the city now completely aban-
doned due to rapid population decline.5  Growing budget issues led
1. Brian Palmer, How Did Detroit Become Motor City?, SLATE (Feb. 29, 2012, 5:59
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/02/why_are
_all_the_big_american_car_companies_based_in_michigan_.html, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/SQ62-VLPD (explaining Detroit’s natural advantages, such
as being the home of Henry Ford, its abundance of iron ore, the accessibility of its
shipping routes, and, to a certain extent, luck).
2. Arthur Herman, Op-Ed., The Arsenal of Democracy: How Detroit Turned Indus-
trial Might into Military Power During World War II, THE DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 3,
2013, 1:00 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130103/OPINION01/3010
30336, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LL3Y-6YH7.
3. A Brief History of Motown Records, PAN-AFRICAN NEWS WIRE (Dec. 25, 2006),
http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2006/12/brief-history-of-motown-records-
born_25.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/ZJ4N-T7CS (describing Detroit’s
development as “Hitsville USA”).
4. Paul Harris, How Detroit, the Motor City, Turned into a Ghost Town, THE GUARD-
IAN (Oct. 31, 2009, 8:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/01/de-
troit-michigan-economy-recession-unemployment, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/37PL-5JHJ.
5. See John Reeves, 19 Shocking Facts About Detroit’s Bankruptcy, USA TODAY
(Dec. 3, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/
2013/12/02/19-facts-about-detroit-bankruptcy/3823355/, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/FL5H-7WWX. In 2012, Detroit’s population was 684,799, down 63%
from 1,849,600 in 1950.  The ripple effect of this exodus can be seen in the city’s
infrastructure, as 40% of streetlights no longer function, half of Detroit’s parks
are now closed, and an estimated 78,000 structures have been abandoned. Id.
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Detroit to file for bankruptcy—the largest municipality to ever do so.6
Numerous factors contributed to the collapse: the decline of the Amer-
ican automobile industry, lack of political leadership, social unrest,
the list goes on.7  Furthermore, like a frightening number of cities,
Detroit is also burdened by unfunded pension liabilities that will re-
quire leaders and employees to work together to reach a balanced and
economically sustainable plan.8
Detroit’s struggles became a national concern when the United
States government issued a massive bailout to save the automobile
giants in late 2008.9  Public institutions—like Detroit Public
Schools—are similarly crippled, but must forge their own path for-
ward without a bailout.  That leaves Jack Martin, the Detroit Public
Schools’ Emergency Manager, with the unenviable task of shedding
6. Id.  Although the exact level of debt is unclear, estimates place the figure between
$18 and $20 billion.  Detroit’s revenue has dropped 40% since 1962, resulting in a
projected negative cash flow of almost $200 million for the 2014 fiscal year alone.
Id.
7. See generally Tom Krisher & Dee-Ann Durbin, Detroit and Bankruptcy: How a
Once-Great American City Endured Decades of Decay, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
17, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/18/detroit-and-bank-
ruptcy-decay-how-went-bankrupt-why_n_3620004.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/KV48-3LR9.
8. Id.  Reports indicate $3.5 billion of the city’s debt stems from unfunded pension
liability to retired workers.  Detroit recently proposed a plan in which pensioners
would receive approximately 60% of their scheduled, yet currently unfunded pay-
ments.  While these cuts would hurt those who rely on publicly-funded pension
plans, it is considered by most to be pensioner-friendly and all major civil unions
have approved of it.  Nathan Bomey, Detroit’s Bankruptcy Battle Begins, USA
TODAY (Aug. 31, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/08/31/detroit-bankruptcy-trial-begins/14899547/, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/X9LY-VLH4.  The bankruptcy plan was approved by a federal judge in
November 2014—an important step on the road to recovery.  Nathan Bomey,
Matt Helms & Joe Guillen, Judge OKs Bankruptcy Plan; a “Miraculous” Out-
come, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-bankruptcy-decision/18648093/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/V326-UP5N.  Detroit is not unique in regards to
pension-related troubles. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, In San José, Generous
Pensions for City Workers Come at Expense of Nearly All Else, WASH. POST (Feb.
25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-san-jose-gener-
ous-pensions-for-city-workers-come-at-expense-of-nearly-all-else/2014/02/25/3526
cd28-9be7-11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0_story.html, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/34Q3-A3B9 (discussing drastic cuts to public services as a result of civil pen-
sion plans guaranteeing retired public workers up to 90% of their former salaries,
and the political battle that has ensued to curb these negative effects).
9. David Rodgers & Mike Allen, Bush Announces $17.4 Billion Auto Bailout, POLIT-
ICO (Dec. 19, 2008, 8:22 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1208/16740
.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/XKJ9-9FHE (reporting President Bush
signed a $17.4 billion bailout for General Motors and Chrysler in order to avoid a
“disorderly bankruptcy”).
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$127 million in accumulated debt.10  The problem stems in part from a
decline in student enrollment11 and widespread poverty, but it is the
teachers union’s ability to impact policy that most complicates mat-
ters.12  While unions are in the midst of a noticeable decline,13 teach-
ers’ unions remain strong, thanks in part to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.14  Decided in 1977,
Abood upheld teachers’ unions’ right to exact “fair-share” payments
from non-members—that is, fees for collective-bargaining costs, but
not political and ideological union expenditures.15
In Harris v. Quinn,16 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
re-examine its previous holding and determine whether Abood’s rea-
soning withstood renewed scrutiny, or alternatively, whether the pre-
cedent was broad enough to encompass quasi-public employees like
the state-subsidized home health care aides challenging the compelled
union dues.  In a 5–4 decision, the majority found the circumstances
distinguishable from Abood and ruled the fair-share provision uncon-
stitutional.17  By distinguishing from Abood, fair-share provisions re-
main valid for full-fledged public employees.  The decision still gives
organized labor reason to worry, however, as Justice Alito and four
other Justices methodically criticized the reasoning upon which Abood
rests.18
This Note argues the logical criticism provided in Harris, the cur-
rent political environment, and harsh economic realities suggest the
Supreme Court will likely adopt a more reasonable rule in the near
future.19  This new rule would require the Supreme Court to defini-
10. Jennifer Chambers, Detroit School District Cancels Staff Pay Cut, Larger Class
Sizes, THE DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 26, 2014, 11:38 PM), http://www.detroitnews
.com/story/news/education/2014/08/26/detroit-school-district-cancels-staff-pay-
cut-larger-class-sizes/14632141/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/CYH8-TTVK.
Contributing to the district’s debt is the $53 million it pays annual for legacy
debt, that is, payments due to retired school employees for pension plans and
other benefits. Id.
11. Id. (“The district, which once had 300,000 students, has seen enrollment shrink
below 50,000.”).
12. Id.  Martin originally proposed a plan involving pay cuts for teachers and admin-
istrators and increased class sizes that would save around $21 million per year.
He changed the plan after significant teacher backlash, thus any proposed resolu-
tion remains very much in limbo. Id.
13. See infra subsections II.A.2–3.
14. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
15. Id. at 236.  To be clear, the decision ruled fair-share provisions constitutional for
all public employees, not just teachers.
16. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
17. Id. at 2638.
18. Id. at 2630–34.
19. Anti-public-sector unionism sentiment may be gaining prominence, but scholars
have long been highlighting the inherent differences between public-and private-
sector labor. See, e.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON  & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UN-
IONS AND THE CITIES: STUDIES OF UNIONISM IN GOVERNMENT (1972) (providing per-
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tively overrule Abood, and hold that fair-share provisions in the public
sector amount to compelled speech and are therefore subject to strict
First Amendment scrutiny.  As was determined in Harris and will be
argued here, these arrangements fail such analysis.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of unions, their develop-
ment, and their current role in American labor.  Part II also discusses
prior judicial treatment of union security arrangements, particularly
fair-share provisions.20  Part III describes the facts in Harris, the
holding, and the reasoning used by the majority to reach its decision.
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion raises some meritorious points and
is also discussed.21  Lastly, Part IV posits that the Court should have
completely overturned Abood, instead of merely distinguishing from
it.  The majority was correct to criticize Abood, and though precedent
should typically be respected, there was—and will continue to be—
sufficient justification to overturn it here.  Nonetheless, Harris is al-
ready changing organized labor and likely indicates the majority’s
willingness to remedy Abood’s flawed rule as early as the 2016
Term.22
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Organized Labor in the United States
The United States sought to take full advantage of the massive ec-
onomic boom that followed the industrial revolution, and accordingly
took a laissez-faire approach to business regulation during the nine-
teenth and early-twentieth centuries.23  Big business, Congress, and
the courts formed a triumvirate that kept unionism on the outskirts of
haps the seminal argument that public-sector labor is different than private-
sector labor); Harry C. Katz, Is U.S. Public Sector Labor Relations in the Midst of
a Transformation?, 66 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1031 (2013) (focusing on the polit-
ical component of public-sector organized labor).
20. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961); Ry. Emps. Dep’t. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
21. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644–58.
22. As will be discussed infra, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v.
California Teachers Ass’n, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18,
2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015).  The case is virtually identical to
Abood, and therefore the Court will be forced to affirm or overturn its precedent.
23. Renee L. Powell, Comment, The State of Unions in America: “Chipping” Away at
the Union “Block,” 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 707, 710–11 (1990) (“The Industrial
Revolution served as the catalyst to the growth of unions in the United
States . . . . The government, eager to see the United States become a highly
competitive industrialized nation, allowed businesses to carry on virtually
unregulated.”).
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American labor.24  In 1926, unions scored their first sizable victory
with passage of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), which allowed rail em-
ployees to unionize.25  However, it was not until Congress enacted the
Wagner Act, now known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
that unionization truly began to grow.26
1. Unions Revolutionize American Labor
Unions burst onto the labor scene almost immediately after the
NLRA went into effect.27  In two short decades—from the mid-1930s
to the early-1950s—organized labor became a prominent feature of
the American labor environment.  Fueled first by the Great Depres-
sion and later the post-World War II economic boom, union member-
ship density peaked in 1953.28  The rise in population and emergence
of public labor unions helped the absolute number of union members
grow until 1979, when overall union membership reached its apex at
approximately 21 million.29  This strength in numbers helped create
24. See id. at 712–13 (discussing business supporters’ use of criminal conspiracy
charges, various civil remedies, and questionable application of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act to stifle union activity).
25. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2012)); see also Powell, supra note 23, at 714 (“Unions finally
won the battle, however, with the passage of the [RLA] in 1926.  Congress en-
acted the RLA to establish the rights of railroad employees to form and join un-
ions.”).  Congress initially tried to promote unionization by adopting the Clayton
Anti-Trust Act to supersede the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and exclude unions
from anti-trust claims, but the imprecise language prompted courts to construe
the legislation narrowly, thus harming unions and running contrary to legislative
intent. Id. at 713–14.
26. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)); see also Powell, supra note 23, at
707 (“With the passage of the [NLRA] in 1935, unions first derived the authority
to represent employees in the workplace . . . . [T]he passage of the NLRA enabled
unions to survive in America.”).  The organized labor landscape continued to un-
dergo transformations as Congress’ view of labor unions changed.  For instance,
in 1947, Congress overrode President Truman’s veto to pass the Taft-Hartley Act
as an amendment to the NLRA.  The employer-friendly provisions (e.g., prohibi-
tions on closed-shop provisions and limitations on union-shop provisions) led or-
ganized labor proponents to refer to it as the “Slave Labor Act.”  A. H. Raskin,
Elysium Lost: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 38 STAN. L. REV. 945, 949 (1986).
27. See Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political Conse-
quences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1638
(2014) (“In 1937 alone, U.S. unions grew by 55%, 55% in a single year.”).
28. Id. (defining density as the percentage of members in the workforce who belong to
a union, meaning the ratio of union to non-union employees has been declining
since 1953); see also William John Bux & Miranda Tolar, Houston Janitors and
the Evolution of Union Organizing, 70 TEX. B.J. 426, 426 (2007) (“In 1953, more
than one-third of all private sector workers in the United States were union
members.”).
29. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RES. SERV., UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 10 (2004), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/779R-HSGW; see also News
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powerful negotiating leverage that can still be seen today, as union-
ized workers receive roughly $10,500—or over twenty-five percent—
more annually than their non-unionized counterparts on average.30
2. The Shifting (and Dwindling) Union Landscape
Since its peak, union membership has been on a steady, but signifi-
cant decline.  The most recent statistics from the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics reveal that only 11.1% of wage and salary workers, or 14.6
million individuals, currently belong to a union.31  Accompanying this
general decline is a “revolutionary” transformation of the prototypical
union member.32  Historically, unions existed primarily in the private
sector, but the roles have drastically reversed.  “The percentage of the
private-sector workers that [are] union members declined more than
five-fold from 37% [in 1960]” to just 6.6% in 2013.33  Conversely, “the
percentage of the public sector work force who [are] union members
[has] increased nearly four-fold, from 9.8% in 1960” to 35.7% in
2014.34  Public-sector unionism reached a milestone in 2009 when it
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2014 (Jan. 23, 2015),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7VJW-34AD [hereinafter BLS News Release]
(“In 1983, the first year for which [reliable union data was] available, the union
membership rate was 20.1 percent, and there were 17.7 million union workers.”).
30. See BLS News Release, supra note 29.  It should be noted there are other factors
that help to account for this disparity, including the differences in educational
requirements and geographic influences. Id.
31. Id.  This represents nearly a twenty percent drop since 1983 for a net reduction of
3.2 million employees.  These numbers are largely unchanged from figures re-
ported in 2012. See also R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Public Sector Collective Bargain-
ing at the Crossroads, 44 URB. LAW. 185, 185–86 (2012) (“Between 1960 and 2010,
[the percentage of unionized workers] dropped from 28.6% to 11.9%.”).
32. Clark, Jr., supra note 31, at 185 (“[T]he single biggest story in labor relations
over the past half of a century [is] the emergence of public sector collective bar-
gaining as the most dominant force in the American labor movement.  It is not an
overstatement to suggest that the transformation of the American labor move-
ment from private sector domination to public sector domination is truly
revolutionary.”).
33. Id. at 186; BLS News Release, supra note 29.  There are numerous reasons al-
leged for this massive decline in the private sector, including the globalization of
manufacturing jobs, hostility from American businesses, and unions’ inability to
rally service and information-centered employees.  Drew DeSilver, American Un-
ions Membership Declines as Public Support Fluctuates, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 20,
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-
membership-trails-far-behind-public-support/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
MF7Y-TB65.
34. Clark, Jr., supra note 31, at 186; BLS News Release, supra note 29.  Union mem-
bership is densest among local government workers at 40.8%, followed by state
government and federal government employees at 30.9% and 26.5%, respectively.
Id.
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surpassed private-sector unions in regards to total membership for the
first time.35
3. Unions Under Attack
“Faced with growing budget deficits and restive taxpayers, elected
officials from Maine to Alabama, Ohio to Arizona, are pushing new
legislation to limit the power of labor unions, particularly those repre-
senting government workers, in collective bargaining and politics.”36
Perhaps even more surprising than the movement’s broad geographic
scope is the bipartisan support it receives from politicians.37
Comparatively, however, Republican leaders have been more will-
ing to publicly and aggressively target unions.38  In 2011, the battle
between the Governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, and Wisconsin un-
ions gripped the entire nation.39  Governor Walker and the Republi-
can-controlled legislature passed sweeping legislation that severely
restricted union power within the state.40  Not only does Wisconsin
remain a political hotbed,41 but anti-union Republicans and pro-union
Democrats have also engaged in skirmishes around the country over
legislation regarding similar issues including wage increases, pen-
35. See Eileen Norcross, Public Sector Unionism: A Review 1 (Mercatus Ctr., George
Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 11-26, 2011).  As of 2014, the proportion was
virtually deadlocked, with 7.2 million public-sector union members and 7.4 mil-
lion private-sector union members.  BLS News Release, supra note 29.
36. Steven Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, at A1.
37. See id. (“State officials from both parties are wrestling with ways to curb the
salaries and pensions of government employees, which typically make up a signif-
icant percentage of state budgets.” (emphasis added)).  For example, in 2011,
Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo called for a salary freeze for New York state
employees. Id.
38. See id.
39. Clark, Jr., supra note 31, at 200–02.  The legislation sparked massive demonstra-
tions that exceeded 100,000 people at points, and even led to a controversial re-
call election of Governor Walker.  Steve Contorno, Dan Benson & Ben Jones,
Police: Wisconsin Protest Saturday “One of Largest,” USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2011,
2:12 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-02-26-wisconsin-
saturday-rally_N.htm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/KHB6-S7N4.
40. Clark, Jr., supra note 31, at 200–02.  Notable provisions in Wisconsin’s Act 10
include union restrictions relating to home health care workers paid by Medicaid
(like those at issue in Harris), limitations on acceptable bargaining topics, and a
total prohibition on fair-share provisions. Id.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court re-
cently upheld Act 10 after a challenge from labor organizers in Madison Teach-
ers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 2014).
41. See Byron York, For GOP, Importance of Scott Walker Race Equals Any Senate
Matchup, WASH. EXAM’R (Sept. 19, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.washingtonex-
aminer.com/for-gop-importance-of-scott-walker-race-equals-any-senate-matchup/
article/2553646, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TX8W-MUP5 (discussing oppo-
nents’ efforts to recall Walker, the ensuing legal battle, Walker’s 2014 reelection
campaign, and his presidential aspirations).
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sions, and unions’ ability to strike.42  Governor Walker’s decision to
run for President in the 2016 election pushed the role of public-sector
unions further into the limelight,43 but he ultimately withdrew his bid
given the crowded Republican field.
B. Unions’ Drive to Survive and Judicial Treatment of
Union Security Arrangements
1. Setting Up Shop
Unions have initiated various self-preservation mechanisms in re-
sponse to the decline in union membership,44 employer-friendly fed-
eral legislation,45 and recent state legislation.46  Union security
arrangements are one tool used to help keep unions alive.  A security
provision is “an agreement between a union and an employer that the
employer will require all employees to undertake some specified level
of union support as a condition of employment.”47
Union security arrangements can be visualized on a spectrum,
with very restrictive shop agreements on one end and those preserv-
ing freedom for employees on the other.  Most prohibitive are closed-
shop arrangements, where the employer promises to only hire employ-
ees who belong to the union and pay full dues.48  Slightly less demand-
ing are union-shop agreements, which allow an employer to hire a
non-union member so long as the employee joins the union shortly af-
ter gaining employment.49  More moderate are agency-shop clauses or
fair-share provisions, which require employees to pay their propor-
tional share for “chargeable activities,”50 but not for ideological ex-
42. See Clark, Jr., supra note 31, at 200–11 (detailing eleven states’ attempt to curb
local fiscal crises through limiting union power in various ways).
43. Gary O’Donoghue, Could Union-Busting Scott Walker Be the Next President?,
BBC (July 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32238867,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5HYQ-YKKS.  Many Republican presidential
hopefuls threw their name into the ring for 2016, but Scott Walker was seen by
many as a conservative poster child with ties to big business that made him a
force to be reckoned with, despite his eventual withdrawal. Id.
44. See supra text accompanying note 31.
45. See supra text accompanying note 24.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 36–42.
47. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 57 (1990).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 58; see also Powell, supra note 23, at 721 (“A union shop requires, as a
condition of employment, that the employee join the union and that he begin pay-
ing dues after working for thirty days.”).
50. See infra text accompanying note 75.
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penditures.51  Least restrictive are open-shop arrangements,
employed by so-called “right-to-work” states, which prohibit making
union involvement mandatory or imposing fees, and thus provide
workers with an unqualified choice as to whether to contribute to the
organization.52  It is important to note that every union security
agreement except open-shop arrangements imposes some requirement
on employees to associate with a union.
2. Hanson and Street Set the Scene
In 1955, the United States Supreme Court first analyzed the valid-
ity of union security arrangements in Railway Employees’ Department
v. Hanson.53  In Hanson, a group of non-unionized rail workers chal-
lenged the validity of the union-shop provision in the RLA that re-
quired them to join the union within sixty days.54  The petitioners
argued the provision was constitutionally impermissible and thus did
not preempt the Constitution of the State of Nebraska, which guaran-
tees that “[n]o person shall be denied employment because
of . . . refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization.”55  The Ne-
braska Supreme Court held the provision infringed on federal First
and Fifth Amendment rights,56 but the United States Supreme Court
disagreed and overruled the state court’s decision and declared the
union-shop provision constitutional.  The RLA therefore preempted
the Nebraska’s constitutional amendment granting an unqualified
right to work.57
51. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democ-
racy?  A Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277,
291–92 (2013).
52. James C. Thomas, Right-to-Work: Settled Law or Unfinished Journey, 8 LOY. J.
PUB. INT. L. 163, 163 (2007).  In 2012, Michigan, a state that “has long been a
symbol of union might and an incubator for the American labor movement,” be-
came the twenty-fourth state to outlaw any sort of union security arrangement.
Monica Davey, Limits on Unions Pass in Michigan, Once a Mainstay, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2012, at A1.
53. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
54. Id. at 227.
55. Id. at 228; see NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 13 (“No person shall be denied employment
because of membership in or affiliation with, or resignation or expulsion from a
labor organization or because of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organiza-
tion; nor shall any individual or corporation or association of any kind enter into
any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from employment because of mem-
bership in or nonmembership in a labor organization.” (emphasis added)).  Today,
this would be coined a “right-to-work” clause.
56. Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955), rev’d sub
nom. Ry. Emps. Dep’t, 351 U.S. 225.
57. Ry. Emps. Dep’t, 351 U.S. at 238.  The Court acknowledged the argument that
“the union shop agreement forces men into ideological and political associations
which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and
freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 236.  The Court failed
to find any infringement, however, since dues were only being required for bar-
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The Supreme Court revisited the validity of the RLA’s union-shop
provision in 1961 with International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street.58
Much like Hanson, the petitioners were non-union members, but this
time they could show their required union fees were used for ideologi-
cal and political purposes.59  The Court found this to be determinative
since the RLA did not “[vest] the unions with unlimited power to
spend exacted money,” and therefore the employees were entitled to
relief.60 Street clarified Hanson in a way favorable to objecting em-
ployees, but the Court imposed a heavy burden to obtain a remedy.61
The majority’s holding was admittedly narrow and the opinion ad-
dressed First Amendment concerns only in passing.62
3. Abood Draws the Line
The Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education may be considered the “birth of the agency shop for public-
sector unions.”63  The dispute in Abood arose after Michigan enacted
legislation that permitted local government employees to unionize.
Any appointed union could then impose collective bargaining dues on
dissenting non-members.64  Teachers in Detroit voted to unionize, and
gaining purposes, and thus “there is no more an infringement or impairment of
First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state
law is required to be a member of an integrated bar.” Id. at 238.  The irony of this
comparison is discussed infra, note 100.
58. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
59. Id. at 744–45 (“[T]he money [the petitioner] was thus compelled to pay to hold his
job was in substantial part used to finance the campaigns of candidates for fed-
eral and states offices whom he opposed, and to promote the propagation of politi-
cal and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which he disagreed.  The
Superior Court [of Georgia] found that the allegations were fully proved and en-
tered a judgment and decree enjoining the enforcement . . . .”).
60. Id. at 768.
61. Id. at 774–75 (awarding an injunction and restitution only if the employee identi-
fies the exact expenditures he opposes and can trace his money to the undesirable
use, thus placing the onus entirely on the employee and essentially creating a
presumption of validity).  The Court in Brotherhood of Railway & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963) later dropped the specificity requirement since “[i]t
would be impracticable to require a dissenting employee to allege and prove each
distinct union political expenditure to which he objects.” Id. at 118.  Instead, a
general complaint against all political expenditures is sufficient. Id.  Still, the
burden remains significant.
62. Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (“We only hold that the requirement for financial support
of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its
work . . . does not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments.”).  For a more
comprehensive analysis of the First Amendment concerns in Street, see Justice
Black’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 780–819 (Black, J., dissenting).
63. Deborah Prokopf, Note, Public Employees at the School of Hard Knox: How the
Supreme Court Is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a History Lesson, 39 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2013).
64. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.211 (1970).  The agreement “[required] every
teacher who had not become a Union member within 60 days of hire . . . to pay
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the Detroit Federation of Teachers subsequently became the exclusive
representative of Detroit teachers.  The agreement between the union
and the city included an agency-shop provision.65  A class of teachers
who opposed representation filed suit on constitutional grounds.
The teachers contended that their situation was unique from Han-
son and Street given their status as public employees, and urged the
Court to modify its prior analysis under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to reflect the degree to which “collective bargaining in
the public sector is inherently ‘political.’ ”66  The Court appeared re-
ceptive to this argument and acknowledged the substantial differ-
ences when compared to the private market.67
Furthermore, the majority noted that requiring an employee “to
help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be
thought . . . to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom to
associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as
he sees fit.”68  However, under Hanson and Street “such interference
as [existed was] constitutionally justified by the legislative assess-
ment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of
labor relations established by Congress.”69  The supposed rationale for
such infringement was to maintain labor peace and reduce the risk of
free riders,70 neither of which the Court considered diminished by the
fact the petitioners worked in the public sector.71
Much like in Street, the Court flatly rejected the notion that an
employee could be assessed any fee to support political beliefs he op-
poses.72  In so stating, the Court drew the line for fair-share provi-
the Union a service charge equal to the regular dues required of Union members.”
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 212 (1977).
65. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211–12.
66. Id. at 227.
67. Id. at 227–28.  The Court discussed how “[a] public employer, unlike his private
counterpart, is not guided by the profit motive . . . [and therefore] lacks an impor-
tant discipline against agreeing to increases in labor costs that in a market sys-
tem would require price increases.”  Furthermore, “decisionmaking by a public
employer is above all a political process . . . [since] the employees have the oppor-
tunity to affect the decisions of government on the other side of the bargaining
table.” Id.
68. Id. at 222.
69. Id. at 222–23.
70. Free riding is possible since “a union has a duty to represent not only union mem-
bers, but also members of its bargaining unit,” meaning nonmembers may obtain
most or all benefits without joining.  Connye Y. Harper, Origin and Nature of the
Duty of Fair Representation, 12 LAB. LAW. 183, 183 (1996).  State laws and the
involved collective-bargaining agreements are the source of a public union’s duty
to fairly represent all members of the bargaining unit. Id.
71. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224.
72. Id. at 233–35 (“[F]reedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advanc-
ing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments . . . . The fact that appellants are compelled to make, rather than
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sions in the public sector: employees may be compelled to pay for
chargeable activities, but are free to refuse any dues “not germane to
[the union’s] duties as collective-bargaining representative.”73  The
Court declined to further define the tipping point between chargeable
and non-chargeable activities given the dearth in the evidentiary re-
cord on the issue, but it accurately predicted that there would be “diffi-
cult problems in drawing lines,” especially since “the line may be
somewhat hazier” in the public sector.74
III. HARRIS V. QUINN
Despite the occasional difficulties courts have in applying the rule
set forth in Abood, the public (employees, employers, and unions) un-
derstood the case as settling the issue of how to treat fair-share provi-
sions in the public sector.75  Less clear, however, was whether the
precedent established under Abood controlled the gray area between
private employees and full-fledged public employees.  It is precisely
this issue that Pamela Harris and her co-petitioners asked the Su-
preme Court to resolve in Harris, with respect to a fair-share provi-
sion affecting home health care workers who were classified as state
employees solely for collective-bargaining purposes.76
A. Facts and Posture of Harris v. Quinn
“Millions of Americans . . . are unable to live in their homes with-
out assistance and are unable to afford the expense of in-home care.”77
In an attempt to minimize unnecessary institutionalization, many
states have established Medicaid-funded and state-run programs that
compensate personal assistants who provide homecare services for in-
dividuals in need.78  The Illinois Rehabilitation Program seeks to pro-
prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an in-
fringement of their constitutional rights.”).
73. Id. at 235–36; see also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (2014) (“Instead of
drawing a line between the private and public sectors, the Abood Court drew a
line between, on the one hand, a union’s expenditures for collective-bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes, and, on the other,
expenditures for political or ideological purposes.” (citations omitted)).
74. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236.  In reference to the facts at hand, the Court granted par-
tial injunctive and compensatory relief since the petitioners sufficiently notified
the union they opposed political expenditures. Id. at 241.
75. While Abood was accepted as the law, its line was refined.  In Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the Court said “chargeable activities must (1)
be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s
policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free-riders’; and (3) not significantly
add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency
or union shop.” Id. at 519.
76. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2623–26.
77. Id. at 2623.
78. Id. at 2623–24.
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vide this in-house care while simultaneously reducing costs for the
state.79
The Rehabilitation Program creates a unique relationship triangle
between the person in need of care (the customer),80 the personal as-
sistant, and the Illinois state government.  The relevant statutes and
regulations expressly state that it is the customer who employs and
controls the personal assistant,81 and the procedure for providing care
supports this understanding.82  “While customers exercise predomi-
nant control over their employment relationship with personal assist-
ants, the State, subsidized by the federal Medicaid program, pays the
personal assistants’ salaries . . . . Other than providing compensation,
the State’s role is comparatively small.”83
Determining whether personal assistants are government employ-
ees is significant since the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act allows
state employees to collectively bargain.  Furthermore, the Act specifi-
cally includes a fair-share provision when a union is elected to be the
exclusive representative of a group.84  The Service Employees Inter-
national Union (SEIU) campaigned to become the exclusive represen-
tative for personal assistants in 1985, but the Illinois Labor Relations
Board rejected the attempt since Illinois did not have sufficient control
over the personal assistants to be considered their employer.85
In 2003, Governor Rod Blagojevich superseded the Board’s decision
by issuing an executive order that pronounced personal assistants to
79. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 676.10 (2014).
80. Id. § 676.30(b).  “Customer” is used to define anyone who receives care through
the Rehabilitation Program. Id.
81. Id. § 676.30(p) (“Personal Assistant or PA—an individual employed by the cus-
tomer to provide varied . . . services.” (emphasis added)).  “[The State] shall not
have control or input in the employment relationship between the customer and
the personal assistants.” Id. § 676.10(c) (emphasis added).
82. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2624 (“Other provisions of the law emphasize the customer’s
employment status.”).  In practice, the customer has broad discretion and is re-
sponsible for finding, hiring, and training, evaluating, and if necessary, firing the
personal assistant.  The personal assistant must also adhere to the Service Plan,
which outlines the care the customer receives.  These plans are tailored to each
individual and the state plays, at most, a minimal role in developing them.  It is
the customer and physician who must sign off on such plans. Id.
83. Id.  Illinois does set some basic requirements for employment, mandates and aids
as needed in annual performance reviews, and suggests possible tasks for per-
sonal assistants. Id. at 2624–25.  It should be noted that although the majority
and dissent interpreted the same respective state duties, the dissent argued this
constituted far greater control than the majority acknowledged. See infra note
117.
84. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (2013).  Any such exclusive collective-bargaining agree-
ment “may include . . . a provision requiring employees covered by the agreement
who are not members of the organization to pay their proportionate share of the
costs of the collective bargaining process, contract administration, and pursuing
matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment.” Id.
85. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625–26.
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be state employees solely for collective-bargaining purposes.86  The Il-
linois Legislature quickly codified the order and declared personal as-
sistants state employees “[s]olely for the purposes of [collective
bargaining]” and thus allowed “[t]he State [to] engage in collective
bargaining with an exclusive representative of . . . personal assist-
ants.”87  Personal assistants voted and appointed SEIU Healthcare Il-
linois & Indiana as the exclusive representative of workers in the
Rehabilitation Program.88  In 2009, Governor Pat Quinn repeated the
steps taken by his predecessor in an attempt to encourage personal
assistants in the Disabilities Program to unionize.89
A group of eight personal assistants, three from the Rehabilitation
Program and five from the Disabilities Program, filed a class suit
against Governor Quinn and the involved unions in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois.  The petitioners sought an injunction against the fair-
share provision and a declaratory judgment that the provision in the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act that allowed unions to impose a
fair-share fee violated objectors’ First Amendment rights.90  The peti-
tioners—several of whom were related to their respective customers, a
practice common among personal assistants—opposed the union en-
tirely and did not want to support it in any manner.91
86. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2003–08 (2003) (“[P]ersonal assistants are not State employ-
ees for purposes of eligibility to receive statutorily mandated benefits because the
State does not hire, supervise, or terminate personal assistants . . . [but the]
State shall recognize a representative designated by a majority of the personal
representatives as the exclusive representative of all personal assistants . . . .”).
Governor Blagojevich asserted such action was necessary to improve the services
provided and to receive feedback from the collective voice of personal assistants.
Id.
87. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2405/3(f) (2012).
88. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.  The agreement between the parties included a fair-
share provision.  In the year prior to Harris, SEIU collected over $3.6 million in
fees from the personal assistants. Id.
89. See 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/2–1 to 80/2–17 (1990); ILL. ADMIN. CODE 59
§§ 117.100–117.145 (2014); Ill. Exec. Order No. 2009–15 (2009).  The Rehabilita-
tion and Disabilities programs followed the same path from a legislative perspec-
tive, but employees under the Disabilities Program declined to unionize and
therefore appointed no exclusive representative. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 n.30;
see also Jacob Huebert, Harris v. Quinn: A Win for Freedom of Association, 2014
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 198–99 (2014) (describing a nationwide union strategy to
boost union membership by unionizing individuals who receive a government
subsidy but are not full-fledged public employees; the strategy first took hold in
California in 1999 and soon spread to fourteen other states).
90. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
91. Id.  The Court specifically mentioned Susan Watts, a Rehabilitation Program
personal assistant who cares for her daughter.  Watts’ daughter suffers from
quadriplegic cerebral palsy and requires constant care. Id.  Pamela Harris, the
lead petitioner, provides services to her son under the Disabilities Program.
Huebert, supra note 89, at 200.  Harris’ son Joshua has a rare genetic syndrome
and the Disabilities Program allows him to stay out of an institution.  Shortly
after Governor Quinn signed the executive order, union representatives ap-
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The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,92 but the two courts
reached that result in noticeably different ways.  The district court
paid little mind to who employed the personal assistants, and instead
focused on the government interests in promoting labor peace and
eliminating free-rider concerns.93  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
classified the personal assistants as joint employees—that is, em-
ployed both by Illinois and the customer—and therefore applied
Abood.94  Both courts dismissed the Disability Program assistants’
complaints on ripeness grounds since the assistants declined to
unionize.95
B. The Majority Opinion
In Harris, a band of union objectors pushed for a full-scale reversal
of Abood,96 while Governor Quinn and company wanted a marginal
extension of the pro-labor precedent.97  Instead of granting either
party’s wish, however, the Supreme Court reached a delicate compro-
mise that favored the personal assistants, but kept Abood fully intact.
The Supreme Court classified personal assistants as quasi-public em-
ployees—unlike schoolteachers or other full-fledged government em-
ployees—and thus navigated away from Abood to conclude the fair-
share provision violated the personal assistants’ First Amendment
rights.98
The Court first noted that Abood is “something of an anomaly”
since free-rider concerns are typically insufficient to defeat First
Amendment concerns.99  The majority then launched into a historical
analysis of Abood’s precedential footing to determine whether to ex-
tend its rule to the immediate situation.  Accordingly, the opinion first
set its sights on Hanson.100  In that case, the Court failed to ade-
quately perceive the First Amendment concerns raised by the RLA’s
proached her about pledging support to the unionization effort.  Harris refused;
she believed the fees would be better spent caring for her son.  Harris then rallied
the support of other personal assistants participating in the Disabilities Pro-
gram, and together the personal assistants overwhelmingly voted against unioni-
zation.  Although the Court focused mostly on the Rehabilitation Program, there
is no doubt Harris was a catalyst for challenging the relevant legislation. Id.
92. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627.
93. Harris v. Quinn, No. 10–cv–02477, 2010 WL 4736500, at *5–9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12,
2010).
94. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 697–99 (7th Cir. 2011).
95. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 n.30.
96. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2627 (majority opinion).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2627 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277,
2290 (2012)).
100. Id. at 2627–29.
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union-shop provision by dismissing the constitutional issue with a sin-
gle sentence: “On the present record, there is no more an infringement
or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the
case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an
integrated bar.”101  The Harris majority marveled at the shallow and
ironic analysis, particularly since the issue of required dues for an in-
tegrated bar had not yet been resolved.102
The Court discussed Street’s analysis of the RLA’s union-shop
agreement and its First Amendment ramifications much more favora-
bly.  Unlike Hanson, Street recognized the involved Constitutional is-
sues were “of the utmost gravity.”103  While Street’s ultimate
conclusion received praise from the Court, its remedy that allows em-
ployees to obtain partial refunds of improperly used fees did not be-
cause it proved difficult to apply and was thus conceptually
unsound.104
The Court saved its harshest criticism for Abood, however, and
made its distaste for that decision apparent since “[its] analysis is
questionable on several grounds.  Some of these [flaws] were noted or
apparent at or before the time of the decision, but several have become
more evident and troubling in the years since then.”105  As noted ear-
lier, Abood was the first case to involve a union security arrangement
in the public sector, but it still “treated the First Amendment issue as
largely settled by Hanson and Street.”  The majority stated such rea-
soning was erroneous since “Street was not a constitutional decision at
all, and Hanson disposed of the critical question in a single, unsup-
ported sentence that its author essentially abandoned a few years
101. Id. at 2629 (quoting Ry. Emps. Dep’t. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956)).
102. Id.  The Court addressed the issue five years after Railway Employees’ Depart-
ment v. Hanson in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).  In a 5–4 decision
that produced five varying opinions, the Court upheld forced membership of an
integrated bar. Id.  Justice Douglas, author of the Hanson opinion, ironically was
the strongest dissenter:
Once we approve this measure, we sanction a device where men and wo-
men in almost any profession or calling can be at least partially regi-
mented behind causes which they oppose.  I took on the Hanson case as a
narrow exception to be closely confined.  Unless we so treat it, we practi-
cally give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional
people into goose-stepping brigades.  Those brigades are not compatible
with the First Amendment.
Id. at 884–85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 749 (1961)).
104. Id. at 2630; see also Street, 367 U.S. at 796 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the
Court’s remedy may prove very lucrative to special masters, accountants, and
lawyers, this formula . . . promises little hope for financial recompense to the
individual whose First Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated.”); id.
at 814 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (suggesting it naı̈ve to think economic and
political concerns are separable for union expenditures).
105. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632.
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later.”106  Furthermore, the Abood Court questionably held that labor
peace and elimination of the free-rider concern were sufficient justifi-
cations for any First Amendment concern.107
Despite the Court’s palpable distaste for Abood, it did not overrule
the decision to hold fair-share provisions in the public sector are un-
constitutional or subject to a higher level of scrutiny.  Instead, the
Court distinguished Abood by classifying personal assistants as quasi-
public employees since “the State’s authority with respect to these two
groups is vastly different.”108  Whereas with public employees the
State establishes qualifications, hires, supervises, and evaluates per-
formance, the customer almost exclusively performs those functions
with respect to personal assistants.109
Since Abood did not control, the Court applied the exacting First
Amendment scrutiny test discussed two years prior in Knox.110
Under that framework, a fair-share provision can only be upheld if it
“serve[s] a ‘compelling state interest . . . that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational free-
doms.’”111  The two proffered justifications—labor peace and elimina-
tion of free ridership—both fell short of a compelling state interest in
the Court’s eyes.112  With respect to labor peace, the Court noted such
concerns were marginal since there was no threat of a rival union or
challenge to SEIU’s status as exclusive representative, nor was there
any common workplace where personal assistants interacted with one
another.113  The Court similarly dismissed the free-rider argument
since that rationale is “generally insufficient to overcome First
Amendment objections.”114  Since the fair-share provision failed to
pass exacting First Amendment scrutiny it was reversed in relevant
part, affirmed in part, and remanded.115
106. Id. at 2632; see supra text accompanying note 101.
107. Id. at 2631.
108. Id. at 2634.
109. Id.  The Court also pointed out other distinctions such as the limited benefits
provided to personal assistants and the lack of potential vicarious liability on the
state for actions by a personal assistant. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes
80–82.
110. Id. at 2639; see Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277
(2012). Knox involved the requisite notice for a union to impose a special assess-
ment on dissenting nonmembers, and the Court issued what many consider to be
the first attack on Abood.  It is worth noting that Justice Alito, author of the
majority opinion in Harris, also wrote the majority decision in Knox.  Conven-
tional wisdom thus suggests he will pen the opinion in Friedrichs, depending on
how the case is decided.
111. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2939 (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289).
112. Id. at 2639–40.
113. Id. at 2640.
114. Id. at 2627 (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289).
115. Id. at 2644.  The Court affirmed the dismissal of the Disabilities Program assist-
ants’ claims since they were not ripe. Id. at 2644 n.30.
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C. The Dissent
The dissent maintained that the fair-share provision was constitu-
tional.116  According to the dissent, the immediate situation “might
serve as a veritable poster child for Abood—not, as the majority would
have it, some strange extension of that decision.”117  In reaching this
conclusion the dissent argued Illinois was a joint-employer, rather
than a quasi-employer.118  The distinction is significant since classify-
ing personal assistants as employees of both Illinois and the customer
would seemingly bring the case within Abood’s reach.119  The dissent
also highlighted the individual and state benefits of unionization.120
Furthermore, the dissent argued Illinois’ status as an employer gave
it “wider constitutional latitude . . . [since] our cases have recognized
that the Government has a much freer hand in dealing with its em-
ployees than with other citizens.”121
The dissent argued the provision should be held constitutional, and
took issue with the “potshots” the majority took at Abood, calling them
“gratuitous dicta.”122  Nonetheless, the dissent gleaned some relief
from the majority’s failure to overrule Abood.  According to the dis-
sent, this respect to stare decisis was necessary since the majority
lacked the special justification needed to overrule a case that serves as
“the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but thousands of contracts
116. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg
joined in the dissent.
117. Id. at 2648.
118. Id. at 2646.  The dissent argued Illinois held significantly more power over per-
sonal assistants than the majority acknowledged, while the employment aspects
favored by the majority should have a lesser impact on classification analysis. Id.
at 2646–48.
119. The dissent therefore agreed with the reasoning provided by the Seventh Circuit.
See supra note 93.
120. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2648 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Wages for personal assistants
nearly doubled between unionization and Harris.  The dissent suggested this
served to combat workforce shortages and high turnover, while simultaneously
increasing care quality. Id.
121. Id. at 2653 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Precedent supports
this broader discretion since the “government must have the ability to decide how
to manage its employees in order to best provide services to the public.” Id.  The
dissent was thus responsive to the respondents’ claim to apply the two-step test
from Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dist. 205, Will
County, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2653–54 (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing).  The Pickering test first states that public employees only have First
Amendment rights in regards to matters of public concern.  If the involved issue
is in fact of public concern, the Court employs a balancing test, weighing the indi-
vidual’s interest in free speech against the public’s interest in efficient govern-
ment. Id. at 2654.  The dissent found the involved provisions in Abood and
Harris appropriate under Pickering. Id.  Though the majority argued Pickering
did not apply, it still held the provisions would similarly fail under that frame-
work. Id. at 2641–43 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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between unions and governments across the Nation.”123  In the end,
while the dissent was unhappy with the majority’s ruling, it took some
comfort that “[s]ave for an unfortunate hiving off of ostensibly ‘partial-
public’ employees, Abood remains law.”124
IV. ANALYSIS
In the days leading up to the Supreme Court issuing its opinion in
Harris,125 labor law experts identified three possible holdings and
speculated as to how the Court would rule.126  Law professor Benja-
min Sachs explained the Court could: (1) affirm the Seventh Circuit’s
assertion that Abood controls; (2) issue a narrow ruling that distin-
guishes Abood from the partial-public employers in Harris; or (3) over-
turn Abood and effectively turn all public-sector employment into a
right-to-work environment.127  The Court chose the second option, as
Justice Alito and the four other members of the conservative bloc con-
structed a narrow holding—agency-fee provisions are unconstitu-
tional only when imposed on quasi-public employees.
The Court’s approach awarded personal assistants a clear victory,
but left right-to-work proponents wanting a broader prohibition and
pro-labor advocates disgruntled by the majority’s questionable maneu-
vering away from Abood.  Justice Kagan’s dissent persuasively argued
Harris’ distinction between full- and partial-public employees creates
a “perverse result”128 since it could simply prompt governments to
restructure their employment relationships to assert more control,
and such a result “could indeed be ‘perverse.’”129  The dissent used
this argument to further its claim that Abood should control, but it
similarly supports the opposite conclusion—the Court should have
wholly overturned Abood.
Overruling precedent is something the Court does not—and should
not—take lightly.  Stare decisis helps develop the law in a “principled
and intelligible fashion,”130 but it is “not an inexorable command.”131
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2653 (citation omitted).
125. It is interesting to note Justice Alito penned another, more anticipated opinion
that was released on the same day as Harris. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (addressing the contraception mandate in the Afford-
able Care Act, commonly referred to as “Obamacare”).
126. Josh Eidelson, Scalia’s Golden Chance to Kill Unions, SALON (Jan. 6, 2014, 7:30
AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/01/06/scalias_golden_chance_to_kill_unions/?
utm_source=huffpost_politics&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=pubex
change_article, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EB5L-43N8.
127. Id.  Professor Sachs thought the Court was most likely to overturn Abood. Id.
128. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2650–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
129. Huebert, supra note 89, at 218.
130. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
131. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“[S]tare decisis embodies an important social policy.  It rep-
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Indeed, “[P]recedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of
reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is
sure error.”132  Factors often cited by the Court when deciding
whether to overturn precedent include whether the decision was well-
reasoned, whether the decision’s flaws have become more apparent
over time, and the rule’s workability.133
A. Abood’s Line Has Been Exposed as Incorrect, Imaginary,
and Unworkable
A majority of the considerations listed above suggest that the
Court had, and will continue to have, the “special justification”134 nec-
essary to overturn its precedent. Harris acknowledged that Abood
was poorly reasoned;135 experience has highlighted its constitutional
flaws;136 and the rule has proved unworkable.137  Together these fac-
tors sufficiently tip the scales toward readdressing the constitutional-
ity of fair-share provisions in the public sector, and although the
majority seemed to share this perspective it declined to act
accordingly.138
1. Precedential Mistakes
First, Abood rests on weak precedential footing. Harris clearly rec-
ognized this shortcoming in noting “[t]he Abood Court seriously erred
in treating Hanson and Street as having all but decided the constitu-
tionality of compulsory payments to a public-sector union.”139  In real-
ity, both Hanson and Street engaged in a cursory analysis of the First
Amendment concerns, and were much narrower in scope and off point
resents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to
satisfy reasonable expectations.  But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision . . . .”).
132. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
133. Id. at 362–63.  Some other relevant factors look to the antiquity of the precedent
and any reliance interests at stake. Id.
134. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).  The Court has repeatedly dis-
played its willingness to overrule precedent it deems to violate First Amendment
concerns in particular. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363 (“The Court has not
hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.”).
135. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (“The Abood Court’s analysis is questiona-
ble on several grounds.”).
136. Id. (“Some of these [flaws] were noted or apparent at or before the time of the
decision, but several have become more evident and troubling in the years since
then.”).
137. Id. at 2633 (“Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the prac-
tical administration problems that would result in attempting to classify public-
sector union expenditures as either ‘chargeable’ . . . or nonchargeable.”).
138. See also Huebert, supra note 89, at 219 (applying these factors to Harris). But see
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2652 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (focusing more on the considera-
ble reliance interests at stake).
139. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (majority opinion).
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than recognized in Abood.  The author of Hanson admitted its reason-
ing was merely a “narrow exception to be closely confined,”140 and
Street relied more on statutory construction principles than constitu-
tional concerns.141  These cases discussed labor peace and the free-
rider concern, but for Abood to take them as settling the constitutional
issue altogether was an aberration and a “First Amendment issue of
this importance deserved better treatment.”142
2. Lessons Learned the Hard Way
Second, the current political and economic climate illustrate
Abood’s decision to differentiate between chargeable and non-chargea-
ble activities—rather than public and private employees—has proven
inadequate and naı̈ve.  The unique characteristics of public-sector or-
ganized labor make distinguishing between collective-bargaining costs
and those with political implications impossible.  Collective bargain-
ing and its impact on state and local governments have made it a
fiercely political issue and erased any supposed line.
Perhaps the most glaring evidence that public-sector organized la-
bor is inherently political is the partisan divide on the issue.  In a re-
cent Gallup poll, 77% of Democrats approved of unions in general,
whereas only 32% of Republicans shared that belief.143  The same poll
revealed overwhelming bipartisan support for right-to-work laws,144
but nonetheless “[i]t is clear that whether a state has a right-to-work
law in place is a reflection of the politics surrounding labor unions,
with Democrats showing much greater support for labor unions than
Republicans.”145  A clear majority of Americans also opposed fair-
share provisions.146
These results are hardly surprising given the significant burden
public-sector labor unions are placing on local governments.  Cities
140. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 884 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see supra
text accompanying note 102.
141. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2631.
142. Id. at 2632.
143. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Approve of Unions but Support “Right to Work:”
Union Approval at 53% While 71% Favor Right-to-Work Laws, GALLUP (Aug. 28,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175556/americans-approve-unions-support-
right-work.aspx, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/55MN-2FWE.  Roughly 47%
percent of Independents approved of unions. Id.  The poll had a sampling error of
±4 percentage points.
144. Id.  When asked whether he or she would vote for a law for or against a right-to-
work law, 71% of voters said they would support such a law.  Only 22% of voters
would reject such a law, and 7% had no opinion. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.  “[B]y 64% to 32%, Americans disagree that workers should ‘have to join and
pay dues to give the union financial support’ just because ‘all workers share the
gains won by the labor union.’” Id.
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from Detroit147 to Vallejo (California),148 Philadelphia149 to Jefferson,
County (Alabama),150 have witnessed firsthand the dangers of govern-
ment’s “winning” moderate base salaries now in exchange for hand-
some pensions and benefits later.151  The government’s payment
procrastination is now posing problems and forcing governments to
choose between honoring contracts, cutting jobs, or withdrawing ser-
vices in order to avoid insolvency.152  Taking this economic impact
into account, how can public-sector collective bargaining not be a “po-
litical” or “ideological” issue when 43% of voters name the economy
and budget deficit as the top political issue?153  In an attempt to be
proactive, many states have begun to reexamine their public labor
structure.154  Such efforts have resulted in a politically charged scene
that pits organized labor supporters against staunch right-to-work ad-
vocates.  Maybe collective bargaining was not a hot-button political is-
sue when the Court ruled on Abood, but it was when Harris was
decided and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.
3. Practical Difficulties
Lastly, Abood has proven unworkable in practice.  This conclusion
is first evidenced by the administrative problems of classifying union
expenditures—an issue the Court has repeatedly struggled with.155
147. See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text.
148. See George F. Will, Op-Ed., Pension Time Bomb, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/10/AR200809100
2726.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6TL7-JMAU.  Vallejo, a city of
120,000 citizens, filed for bankruptcy after the city council voted unanimously to
seek bankruptcy protection.  Mayor Osby Davis says the public pension crisis
makes sense: “If you have a can that’s leaking two ounces a minute and you put
an ounce a minute in it, it’s going to get empty.” Id.
149. See Kristen Graham & Martha Woodall, SRC Cancels Teachers’ Contract, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:18 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/school_files/
SRC-cancels-teachers-contract.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E4N2-
YQM8.  In a drastic move, Philadelphia policymakers unilaterally cancelled
teacher contracts after negotiations with the teachers union failed due to budget
constraints. Id.
150. See Will, supra note 148.
151. Id.  Will notes pensions are the “perfect vehicle for procrastination” since politi-
cians are long gone by the time the payments become due. Id.
152. See Fletcher, supra note 8 (discussing San José’s decline in services despite tax
raises since pensions guarantee retired city workers up to 90% of their former
salaries).
153. Sarah Dutton et al., What’s the Top Issue for Midterm Election Voters?, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-the-top-is-
sue-for-midterm-election-voters/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JK89-4QUM.
154. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
155. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2633 (2014); see, e.g., Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Air-
line, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S.
507 (1991); Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (all struggling to distinguish
between chargeable and non-chargeable union expenses).
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The Court has tried and failed to add clarity to this process by requir-
ing chargeable activities to be (1) germane to collective bargaining; (2)
justified by the government’s vital interest in labor peace and mitigat-
ing free ridership; and (3) not significantly adding to the free speech
infringement inherent in all agency shop situations.156  As noted by
Justice Scalia, however, “[E]ach one of the three ‘prongs’ of the test
involves a substantial judgment call (What is ‘germane’?  What is ‘jus-
tified’?  What is a ‘significant’ additional burden?).”157
Furthermore, Abood imposes the practical problem of requiring
union dissenters to navigate through a cumbersome, and often ineffec-
tive, challenge process.158  Without legal action, the only check on
union classifications comes from an auditor who is unqualified to
make the legal determination of whether a charge is “germane” or
“justified.”159  The onus then almost always falls on the dissenter to
challenge such fees, which poses a problem since the necessary litiga-
tion is expensive.  The Court has come to acknowledge that the cur-
rent review procedure is “a significant burden for employees to bear to
simply avoid having their money taken to subsidize speech with which
they disagree,”160 yet has neglected to take the appropriate remedial
measures and overturn Abood.
B. Applying Exacting First Amendment Scrutiny to Fair-
Share Provisions
In Harris, the Court applied strict First Amendment scrutiny once
it determined Abood did not control partial-public employees.161  This
approach almost certainly illustrates how the Court would analyze the
question for full-fledged public employees if it came before the Court
as a matter of first impression.  More importantly, it provides the
blueprint for how the Court will likely proceed in a subsequent case
should it determine Abood is no longer good law.  Applying strict scru-
tiny would be in line with precedent involving compelled speech and
mandatory associations162 since an agency-shop provision requires an
156. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519.
157. Id. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Huebert, supra note 89, at 207.  In taking their case to the Supreme Court, the
petitioners in Harris discovered expenses previously deemed “chargeable” in-
cluded union contributions to some organizations actively involved in political
issues. Id.
159. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633.
160. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2294 (2012).
161. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639 (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289) (“[The] provision
does not serve a ‘compelling state interest . . . that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”).
162. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
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objecting employee to “support financially an organization with whose
principles and demands he may disagree.”163
In order to justify legislation allowing for fair-share provisions
under strict First Amendment scrutiny, the government would have to
show: (1) a “compelling state interest,” and (2) that the restriction is
“narrowly tailored.”164  It was once understood that such analysis was
“strict in theory and fatal in fact,”165 and while that may not accu-
rately describe contemporary jurisprudence,166 it would indeed be fa-
tal to a public-sector union’s attempt to extract fees from objecting
non-members.
1. The Lack of Compelling Governmental Interests
Union supporters have historically cited two interests to justify the
imposition of agency-fee provisions: promoting labor peace and limit-
ing free ridership.167 Harris also addressed the petitioner’s argument
that the union had been an effective advocate for the personal assist-
ants, members and non-members alike.168  The Court found each of
these interests insufficient to justify agency fees for quasi-public em-
therein.”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[The] “freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” (emphasis
added)); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of associa-
tion therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1977) (“Thomas Jefferson [said] that ‘to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for a the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.’ ”).  For further discussion on the
development of the compelled speech doctrine, see Timothy J. Straub, Fair Warn-
ing?: The First Amendment, Compelled Commercial Disclosures, and Cigarette
Warning Labels, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201, 1206–12 (2013).
163. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984).
164. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006).
165. Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (discussing
the understanding of strict scrutiny in regards to equal protection, but noting the
language quickly engulfed strict scrutiny in other areas such as the First Amend-
ment); see Winkler, supra note 164, at 805 (“[I]n the hands of the Warren Court,
heightened review certainly appeared to be outcome determinative and always
fatal. . . . Gunther’s line is not just frequently quoted, it is widely accepted by
many as an accurate description of strict scrutiny.”).
166. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (“Strict scru-
tiny must not be strict in theory, but fatal in fact.  But the opposite is also true.
Strict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact.” (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  Some scholars believe rigid tiered analysis is de-
creasing. See Winkler, supra note 164, at 808-09.
167. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2631 (2014).
168. Id. at 2640–41.
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ployees,169 and the same reasoning applies to full-fledged public
employees.
First, the government’s argument that agency fees further their in-
terest in labor peace is misguided.  “Labor peace” is a broad term used
to describe the desire to avoid conflict between workers and their
peers, workers and management, and between rival unions.170  The
majority in Harris persuasively dismissed this interest since employ-
ees who altogether oppose collective bargaining in the public sector do
not want to form a rival union, nor do they challenge a union’s status
as exclusive representative in any way.171  Instead, they want the
right to be free from forced contributions to a labor practice—one with
political undertones—that they oppose.  The Abood Court failed to re-
alize that exclusive representation is not “inextricably linked” to
agency-shop fees; exclusive representation can exist without forcing
union dissenters to pay any dues.172  Therefore, while “labor peace
[may be] no less important in the public sector” than in the private
sector,173 it is not threatening in the way union supporters fear.
Second, the fear free riders would destroy the viability of public-
sector unions is insufficient to constitute a compelling interest.  The
free-rider concern stems from a union’s obligation to represent all em-
ployees in a given industry equally, meaning it cannot bargain solely
for its contributing members.174  Accordingly, some argue an em-
ployee should be forced to pay for the benefits she receives in order to
shoulder her portion of the burden required to obtain the gains.  Not
only did the Court adhere to precedent by rejecting this argument
standing alone,175 but “tolerance of free riders is one of the hallmarks
of a free market system and an inescapable condition in any complex
democratic social system.”176
169. Id. at 2939–40.
170. See E. Wight Bakke, How to Promote Labor Peace, 22 LAB. POL’Y & LAB. REL. 75,
75 (1946) (“Peace in industrial relations is best defined . . . as a state of antago-
nistic cooperation.  Parties with different interests recognize their mutual depen-
dence upon each other, agree to respect the survival needs of the other, while
pursuing their own interest, and to adjust their differences by methods which will
not destroy but rather improve the opportunities of the other.”).
171. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640.
172. Id.
173. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977).
174. See Harper, supra note 70, at 183.
175. See supra text accompanying note 114.
176. Clyde W. Summers, Book Review, 16 COMP. LAB. L.J. 262, 268 (1995) (reviewing
SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND POLITI-
CAL THEORY (1992)).  The Court in Knox favorably quoted Summers’ review in
discussing the free-rider argument:
If a community association engages in a clean-up campaign or opposes
encroachments by industrial development, no one suggests that all re-
sidents or property owners who benefit be required to contribute.  If a
parent-teacher association raises money for the school library, assess-
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This logic comes into focus if unions are treated as what they es-
sentially are—self-interest groups.177  Take the Sierra Club, for exam-
ple: they are one of the largest and most influential interest groups in
the country, with 2.4 million active members pledging to support
green initiatives like the Clean Water Act,178 but not everyone who
reaps the fruit of their labor is obligated to pay.  To combat such free-
rider concerns, interest groups like the Sierra Club must appeal to the
quest for solidarity, common ideology, and the economic incentives to
be gained through membership.179  The threat of free riders is insuffi-
cient for a union to impose dues for other areas of common interest,
and the Court has never articulated any reason unions should be
treated any differently.180
Harris acknowledged a third argument made by the government
and union, namely that the union had achieved gains in the personal
assistants’ best interests.181  This conclusory argument is undermined
by the fact that measuring satisfaction is subjective and the objectors
clearly disapproved of the “progress” made on their behalf.  Notwith-
standing this point, the Court in Harris accepted such gains as accu-
rate and still determined the interest was insufficient.182  There is no
reason to think the interest of “effective advocacy” would garner any
more attention if raised in a case involving full-fledged public
employees.
2. A More Narrowly Tailored Approach
If the government is successful in showing it has a compelling in-
terest that can be served by an agency-shop provision, it must then
demonstrate that its chosen means are narrowly tailored.183  This is
ments are not levied on all parents.  If an association of university
professors has a major function bringing pressure on universities to ob-
serve standards of tenure and academic freedom, most professors would
consider it an outrage to be required to join.  If a medical association
lobbies against regulation of fees, not all doctors who share in the bene-
fits share in the costs.
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289–90 (2012)
(quoting Summers, supra, at 268).
177. See Daniel DiSalvo, Manhattan Inst. for Pol’y Res., Dues and Deep Pockets: Pub-
lic-Sector Unions’ Money Machine, CIVIC REP., Feb. 2012, at 2, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/BN6H-2J2D.
178. SIERRA CLUB: WHO WE ARE, http://www.sierraclub.org/about (last visited Oct. 20,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9DCG-9G4K.
179. See DiSalvo, supra note 177, at 2.
180. See Huebert, supra note 89, at 220 (“Harris has forced public-sector unions to try
a new ‘experiment’: persuading people to give them money voluntarily to advance
their ideas, just like the rest of us have to.”).
181. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2640–41 (noting the wage benefits increases,
training improvements, and added grievance procedures).
182. Id.
183. See Winkler, supra note 164, at 800–01.
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sometimes rephrased to require the government to pursue the “least
restrictive alternative” that is still capable of promoting its inter-
ests.184  The Court has never explicitly analyzed whether the interests
proffered by agency-shop supporters are narrowly tailored, but there
are indeed options that less severely affect an individual’s First
Amendment rights.
One more narrowly tailored approach would be to continue al-
lowing workers to appoint an exclusive union representative, but not
allowing that union to deduct agency fees.  If this harmed unions such
that it was financially undesirable to continue without these pay-
ments, then the union could opt not to bid to represent that industry
at all.  There is proof that this could, and does, work; federal govern-
ment employees around the country can appoint an exclusive union
representative despite operating under an open-shop system,185 as
can public employees in right-to-work states like Nebraska.186  Any
threat to labor peace is therefore mitigated by continuing to allow a
majority of employees to appoint an exclusive union representative.187
Nebraska also employs a less-restrictive method for discouraging
free riders.  Nebraska law allows an employee to appoint his own rep-
resentative in any grievance procedure.  If he decides to use services
provided by the labor organization, however, then he must pay his
proportional share.188  The threat of having to pay for legal represen-
tation is considered the driving force behind Nebraska’s high unioni-
zation rate for teachers.189  Modifying the duty of fair representation
for bargaining items other than salary therefore appears to be a prom-
184. Id.
185. The federal government has operated under an open shop since Congress promul-
gated the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. See 5 U.S.C. § 7111(a) (2012) (“An
agency shall accord exclusive recognition to a labor organization if the organiza-
tion has been selected as the representative . . . by a majority of employees in an
appropriate unit . . . .”); 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012) (“Each employee shall have the
right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from such activ-
ity . . . .” (emphasis added)).
186. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-837 (Reissue 2010) (“Public employees shall have the
right to form, join, and participate in or to refrain from forming, joining, or partic-
ipating in any employee organization of their own choosing.” (emphasis added));
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-838 (Reissue 2010) (“[The Commission of Industrial Rela-
tions] shall certify the exclusive collective-bargaining agent for employees . . . .”).
187. Labor peace may otherwise refer to a government’s desire to keep union members
from striking.  Admittedly, this is particularly important in the public sector
since employees often provide vital services, but states have addressed this con-
cern by adopting broad anti-strike laws. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-821(1)
(Reissue 2010) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to hinder, delay, limit or
suspend the continuity or efficiency of any governmental service . . . by lockout,
strike, slowdown, or other work stoppage.”).
188. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-838(4).
189. See Malin, supra note 51, at 293 (“[E]ven though Nebraska is a right-to-work
state, teacher unions enjoy 100% membership because teachers do not want to
lose representation if they should need it individually.”).
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ising avenue.190  Because state law and independent collective-bar-
gaining agreements define the scope of a public union’s duty of fair
representation,191 it follows that state legislatures could effectively
tailor the union’s duties so as to discourage free riding.
C. What Harris Means for the Future
The Court’s decision in Harris did not have the immediate massive
impact on public-sector labor that First Amendment proponents hoped
for, unions feared, or academics predicted.192  However, to say that
Harris carves out only a small niche that will be narrowly confined is
to ignore the truth.  Personal assistants in Illinois and elsewhere who
do not want to contribute to unions are the clear winners of the deci-
sion.193  Shortly after the Court’s decision, SEIU notified personal as-
sistants in Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Connecticut that it
would cease collecting forced dues.194  Conversely, unions like the
SEIU will feel the economic impact to the tune of $10 million per year
in Illinois alone.195
More speculative, but every bit as noteworthy, is the litigation
likely to arise as a result of Harris.  The Court only complicated the
analysis of agency-fee provisions by creating a new rule for partial-
public employees, and now the lower courts will be faced with two
190. See generally Harper, supra note 70 (discussing the general scope of a union’s
obligation to non-contributing members and the areas in which unions are given
wider latitude to stray from totally fair representation).
191. See id.
192. See Eidelson, supra note 126.
193. Some argue women in particular will benefit since the professions affected are
low paying, female dominated professions. See Julie Gunlock & Aloysius Hogan,
Women Victorious in U.S. Supreme Court’s Harris v. Quinn, HUFFINGTON POST
WOMEN BLOG (July 15, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-gun
lock/women-victorious-in-us-su_b_5584838.hmtl, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/E4KN-EVFQ.
194. See News Release, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. Found., Inc., Nat. Right to
Work Supreme Court Victory Forces SEIU to Abandon Forced Dues Demands in
Ill., Minn., & Mass. (Aug. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/XD2Q-54CL
[hereinafter Right to Work News Release]; Huebert, supra note 89, at 220.  At the
time of writing, other states facing potential challenges include California, Wash-
ington, Oregon, and Vermont.  Perry Chiaramonte, Supreme Court Ruling on
Union Dues Could Cost SEIU Millions in Payback, FOX NEWS (July 1, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/01/harris-v-quinn-ruling-could-force-
seiu-to-return-funds-from-due-skim-scam/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/SU
V8-W6EA.
195. Right to Work News Release, supra note 194.  It is unclear how many personal
assistants will exercise their right not to contribute, but projections suggest SEIU
will lose roughly half of its collections ($20 million) from the 26,000 personal as-
sistants in Illinois.  Chiaramonte, supra note 194.  SEIU represents over 2 mil-
lion employees, 20% of whom are home health aides, and receives a total of
roughly $300 million in fees per year. Id.
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questions.196  First, who exactly qualifies as a “partial-” or “quasi-”
public employee?  Certainly Harris applies to more than just personal
assistants, but courts must now decide where to draw the line.  One
example of extending Harris to other industries already came to frui-
tion for day care providers in Illinois when SEIU announced they
would stop collecting fees from non-members after several providers
challenged the dues.197
The other question awaiting resolution is whether Harris will al-
low class action suits from those covered under Harris to recover pre-
viously collected dues that have now been ruled unconstitutional.  The
Michigan Court of Appeals already addressed such a challenge and
ruled union dissenters have no such right.198  Regardless, resolution
of this issue will undoubtedly continue to play out across the country,
and only time will tell whether other courts will give Harris such ret-
roactive effect.199
Harris therefore has an immediate and tangible impact greater
than one might expect given the facially narrow holding, but the real
significance may be yet to come—perhaps Harris is a sign the Su-
preme Court will soon overturn Abood.  While it is true overruling
Abood would have been the appropriate step in Harris,200 the major-
ity’s apparent restraint is consistent with the trend of the Court under
Chief Justice Roberts.  Paul Smith, who argued before the Supreme
Court on behalf of Illinois and SEIU, acknowledged this pattern: “It
does seem as if the chief justice [sic] has adopted a practice, in some
cases, of voting with a conservative majority but not ruling as broadly
as some others want to do . . . . A large part of this is avoiding overrul-
ing prior cases expressly.”201  Indeed, while the Supreme Court has
explicitly overruled only a small handful of cases since Roberts took
196. See Huebert, supra note 89, at 219 (“So arguably Harris does introduce some
(more) arbitrariness into the law.”).
197. Id. at 219–20.
198. See News Release, Mackinac Ctr. For Pub. Pol’y, SEIU Allowed to Keep Millions
in ‘Dues’ Money it Siphoned Away from Medicaid in Stealth Unionization, Court
of Appeals Rules (Sept. 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/MR32-78HW.
199. See Chiaramonte, supra note 194.
200. See discussion infra sections IV.A–B.
201. Adam Liptak, Precedents Stand Despite Pressure as Chief Justice Takes Gradual
Tack, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, at A14; see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Trap in the
Supreme Court’s “Narrow” Decisions, THE NEW YORKER (June 30, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trap-in-the-supreme-courts-narrow-de-
cisions, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7MXK-YGSC (“It’s generally a two-step
process [for the Roberts Court]: in confronting a politically charged issue, the
court first decides a case in a ‘narrow’ way, but then uses that decision as a prece-
dent to move in a more dramatic, conservative direction in a subsequent case.”).
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the bench in 2005202 it has engaged in “stealth overruling” at a far
higher rate.203
Speculation that the Supreme Court would revisit Abood in the
near future materialized in June 2015 when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n.204
Ten non-union school teachers filed suit to challenge the constitution-
ality of fair-share provisions in the Central District of California.205
The teachers conceded defeat at the district court and Ninth Cir-
cuit206 since Abood unquestionably allows public unions to collect
dues, so the case made its way to the Supreme Court only twenty-six
months after it was filed.
With Friedrichs, the Supreme Court will have no choice but to ei-
ther decisively affirm or overrule Abood and the right of public-sector
unions to collect bargaining-related fees.  It is not a given,207 but Har-
ris’ harsh and justified critique of Abood, the Court’s recent trend of
stealth overruling, and its decision to grant certiorari to hear
202. Charles W. Rhodes, What Conservative Constitutional Revolution?  Moderating
Five Degrees of Judicial Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts Court, 64
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 30 (2011) (listing only two cases expressly overruled in Rob-
erts’ first six years as Chief Justice).
203. Id. at 36 (“[S]o-called ‘stealth’ overruling [occurs when] precedents are hollowed
or curtailed . . . .”).
204. No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3653
(U.S. June 30, 2015) (No. 14–915).  The Court’s decision to grant certiorari was
overshadowed at least somewhat by two major decisions that were issued at the
end of the Term.  First, the Supreme Court upheld the Affordable Care Act for the
second time in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  Second, the Court granted
same-sex couples in all fifty states the right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
205. Order, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 8:13CV00676, 2013 WL 9825479
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013).  In California, “non-union teachers still pay ‘forced dues’
of about $850, or two-thirds the cost of a full union membership.  The other third
goes to the lobbying arm of the union, which tends to favor Democratic candi-
dates overwhelmingly.”  Laura Moser, Why an Upcoming Supreme Court Case
Has Teachers Unions Feeling Very, Very Nervous, SLATE (July 8, 2015, 3:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/schooled/2015/07/08/friedrichs_v_california_teachers_
association_how_a_supreme_court_case_could.html, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/63HX-R2A7.
206. Friedrichs, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847.
207. First, Justice Kagan’s dissent staunchly supported Abood and was supported by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618,
2645 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our precedent about precedent, fairly un-
derstood and applied, makes it impossible for this court to overrule [Abood].”).
Second, granting certiorari only requires four Justices but obtaining a majority
takes five, so it is unclear whether a fifth Justice is willing to overturn precedent.
See David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Hear California Teacher’s Suit—A “Life
or Death” Case for Unions, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-supreme-court-teachers-unions-california-20150630-story.html#pag
e=1, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H3RC-9DXT.  Lastly, though technically
unrelated, it is hard to ignore the momentum captured by the more liberal Jus-
tices in the 2014–2015 Term. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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Friedrichs all suggest Abood’s end is near.  If the Court does in fact
abrogate Abood, over seven million public-sector workers could decide
for themselves whether to financially support the unions that re-
present them; unions may well struggle to make ends meet finan-
cially; and cities will have a fighting chance to resolve their pension
problems and refrain from making impossible-to-keep promises in the
future.
V. CONCLUSION
Harris presented an opportunity for the Court to correct its former
mishandling of agency-shop agreements in the public sector and the
constitutional concerns they present.  Rather than do so, however, the
Court merely distinguished from Abood—all the while criticizing its
incorrect logic and misapplication of constitutional principles.  As a
result of the narrow decision, unions can still compel anti-union public
employees to pay a portion of union dues that are germane to collec-
tive bargaining.  Still, Harris landed a significant body blow to
agency-shop agreements in the public sector even if it did not land the
knockout punch some anticipated.
The Court will revisit Abood—and Harris, for that matter—within
the coming year, and while there can be no question that stare decisis
is a crucial component of our judicial system, the Court has sufficient
justification to overturn precedent when a decision was poorly rea-
soned, constitutional concerns have become more apparent over time,
and the rule continues to present practical difficulties.  The majority
in Harris highlighted Abood’s considerable shortcomings in respect to
each of these factors, and in so doing provided the necessary frame-
work for the Court’s coming decision in Friedrichs.
The Court also revealed its hand in regards to how it will analyze
agency-shop provisions if Abood is indeed overruled. Harris applied
strict First Amendment scrutiny and declared that labor peace and
fear of free riders are not compelling enough government interests to
justify infringing upon an individual’s freedom to associate.  Further-
more, although the Court did not explore whether agency-shop provi-
sions are narrowly tailored to achieve any alleged interests,
experiments with organized labor in right-to-work states like Ne-
braska provide examples of less restrictive alternatives.  Put simply,
there is no reason to think First Amendment analysis would come out
any differently for full-fledged public employees than it did for partial-
public employees.
Someday Harris will likely be remembered as the foundation for
the Court’s coming decision that fully abandons Abood and creates an
open-shop environment for all public-sector employment.  Hopefully
the Court seizes its opportunity next Term with Friedrichs, but until
then, partial-public employees can enjoy their reclaimed freedom, full-
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fledged public employees must continue writing checks to a union they
oppose, and unions will continue to fear the day when they are forced
to collect from only those who believe in their cause.
Chris Schmidt
